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Intensive Family Intervention and the Problem Figuration of ‘Troubled Families’  
Abstract 
This article examines how intensive family interventions in England since 1997, including 
the Coalition Government’s Troubled Families Programme, are situated in a contemporary 
problem figuration of ‘anti-social’ or ‘troubled’ families that frames and justifies the 
utilisation of different models of intensive family intervention. The article explores how 
techniques of classification and estimation, combined with the controversial use of ‘research’ 
evidence in policy making are situated within a ‘rational fiction’ that constructs ‘anti-social’ 
families in particular ways.  The article illustrates how this problem figuration has evolved 
during the New Labour and Coalition administrations in England, identifying their 
similarities and differences. It then presents findings from a study of intensive family 
intervention strategies and mechanisms in a large English city to illustrate how this national 
level discourse and policy framework relates to developing localised practice and the tensions 
and ambiguities that arise.  
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Intensive Family Intervention and the Problem Figuration of ‘Troubled Families’  
 
Introduction 
In Western European nations including the UK, France and the Netherlands, long histories of 
evolving discourses on problematic households and appropriate forms of intervention and 
supervision continue to be manifested in contemporary policy rationales frameworks. In 
England this includes the current Troubled Families programme, while France has 
implemented new targeted family service interventions and the city of Amsterdam has 
experimented with the physical segregation and intensive surveillance of ‘problem families’.  
Tackling social exclusion and addressing anti-social behaviour (ASB) were priorities for the 
UK New Labour administrations between 1997 and 2010 (Flint, 2006; Millie, 2009a and 
2009b; Squires, 2008). New legislative sanctioning mechanisms such as Anti-Social 
Behaviour Orders (ASBOs), Parenting Orders, injunctions and Dispersal Orders and the 
‘Respect’ agenda culminated in the Respect Action Plan (Respect Task Force, 2006) which 
confirmed New Labour’s prioritisation of anti-social behaviour within its social policy 
programmes. However, in the latter years of New Labour, emphasis shifted towards intensive 
family intervention projects as a flagship mechanism for tackling the problematic conduct of 
the most vulnerable families.  
Intensive family intervention projects were premised on a ‘triple-track’ approach of early 
intervention, ‘non-negotiable’ support and enforcement action if support was refused or 
progress not made (Respect Task Force, 2006). The projects ranged in the sites and intensity 
of interventions, from 24-hour support in a bespoke residential unit to weekly visits to 
families in their own homes, and are delivered by local authorities, registered social landlords 
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and charities. They were based on a ‘key worker’ building relationships with family 
members, diagnosing the causes of anti-social behaviour and vulnerability, working with 
families and co-ordinating multi-agency packages of interventions (see Batty and Flint, 2012; 
Flint, 2012 for an overview of models and a summary of evaluation evidence). Over 250 of 
these projects were established in England through the Respect Action Plan and Youth Task 
Force Action Plan and other programmes, while similar projects were established in the 
‘Breaking the Cycle’ programme of the Scottish Government and the early intervention 
projects introduced by the Welsh Assembly Government. Other forms of intensive family 
support, which included key worker and domestic visit elements, were promoted between 
1997 and 2010; for example, Family Nurse Partnerships. But our focus in this article is on 
intensive family interventions that are inherently linked to anti-social behaviour:  as the 
rationale and trigger of referral to the projects; as a mechanism for enacting conditionality 
and engagement (for example risk of eviction, ASBOs or Parenting Orders); and as a key 
focus of the project interventions.  
The UK Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government, elected in 2010, argued that 
more effective responses to ASB were required and critiqued New Labour’s mechanisms 
(particularly ASBOs) for failing to address underlying causes (Home Office, 2011; 2012). 
Initially, the Coalition’s policies were premised on a ‘rehabilitation revolution’ focused on 
prevention and ‘a second chance society’ (Ministry of Justice, 2010; HM Government, 2012) 
although these actually retained an emphasis on early intervention, whole family approaches 
based on a key worker model and ‘non-negotiable’ support, enacted through family 
intervention projects. The Coalition has not specified a specific model to be used, although 
guidance advocates ‘evidenced based programmes’ such as Family Functional Therapy or 
Family Intervention Projects. The Government also aimed to increase support beyond the 
welfare system and to reduce top down state intervention (Ministry of Justice, 2010; HM 
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Government, 2012): enacted through localism, an enhanced interventionist role for 
community, voluntary and private sectors, a more explicit economic paradigm (based on 
payment by results), and a radical reform of the welfare state. The Coalition Government’s 
Troubled Families Programme, which epitomises these approaches, aims to ‘turn around’ the 
lives of 120,000 ‘troubled families’ by April 2015, with all local areas in England required to 
identify their most ‘troubled’ families and to appoint a coordinator to lead the redesign of 
service provision.  
This article begins by applying Van Wel’s (1992) concept of ‘problem figuration’ to the 
construction of anti-social behaviour and the controversies over the use of ‘scientific’ 
research in this field and argues that these debates should be situated within a conceptual 
understanding of the figuration of the problem of anti-social or troubled families and the 
fictional bias inherent to this project of government, evident in the figurations of New Labour 
and the Coalition’s Troubled Families programme. The article then examines the realities and 
challenges of localised practice situated within this national figuration, based on empirical 
research in a Northern English city. It concludes that controversies over specific research 
outputs or governmental claims and the inability to acknowledge continuing gaps in 
understanding are part of a longer historical failure to effectively use acquired research 
knowledge which is inherent to the politics of ‘troubled families’ (Bond-Taylor, 2014) and 
the power of fictions and bias within dominant policy narratives.  
 
Problem Figurations of ‘Troubled Families’ and Interventions 
Van Wel’s (1992) studies of the history of intensive intervention with families in the 
Netherlands develops the concept of problem figuration to show the socially constructed 
nature of policy rhetoric and proposed interventions in defining problems, their causes and 
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the mechanisms to be deployed. Van Wel identifies successive waves of problem figurations, 
with each figuration based on a critique of the failings of its immediate predecessor (as 
evidenced in the Coalition’s framing of New Labour policies). This process has been 
explicitly recognised by Hayden and Jenkins (2014) in their depiction of ‘troubled families’ 
as a ‘wicked problem’ that is continually reconceptualised and ‘re-solved’ depending on 
changes in government.  Van Wel also states the essentially ahistorical nature of any 
contemporary problem figuration, which, for example, fails to acknowledge the long 
genealogy of state intervention with vulnerable families, such as the Family Service Units 
that developed during the 20
th
 Century (see Welshman, 2012). Van Wel (1992) argues that 
the frameworks of intervention (for example, Family Intervention Projects or the Troubled 
Families Programme) may be coherent and rational as an aligned governmental response to 
the narrative political construction of ASB and families (supported by the claimed scientific 
and empirical basis of government’s use of research evidence 
However, this rationality is also underpinned by assumptions and prioritisations that represent 
fictional, historically embedded images and representations of the nature of the problem and 
the targeted subjects of intervention (i.e. ‘troubled’ families) that reflect the ‘structure of bias’ 
in a given period and the wider mechanisms stigmatising troubled families in contemporary 
discourse (see Bond-Taylor, 2014; Levitas, 2014). Van Wel (1992) and Welshman (2012) 
argue that governmental responses to ASB and family vulnerability are not based on 
cumulative insight or the rational utilization of increased knowledge. Indeed, evaluation 
research, despite its controversies and the government’s claim to scientific authority, has yet 
to robustly establish the precise effectiveness or mechanisms of various forms of intervention 
(Van Wel, 1992). 
The problematic nature of the policy knowledge base related to ASB and the efficacy of 
interventions to address it have long been recognised.  Prior (2009) highlights how the 
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relationship between power and knowledge in this field is manifested through an official 
governmental empirical ‘reality’ that denies the ambiguities and gaps in knowledge and fails 
to account for the disjuncture between policy rhetoric and even officially constructed 
evidence.  Family Intervention Projects have been a site of particular contestation between 
government and researchers, and indeed, between researchers themselves, with critics such as 
Garrett (2007) and Gregg (2010) critiquing the methods used to undertake evaluations and 
the analysis and presentation of findings that exaggerate positive and progressive outcomes 
for households (see Batty and Flint, 2012). Similarly, Hayden and Jenkins (2014) have 
critiqued the use of ‘policy-based’ evidence in governmental justifications for the Troubled 
Families programme.  
The Government continues to imbue its rationales for intensive interventions through a 
claimed empirical science of quantitative estimation. The rhetorical claim by Iain Duncan 
Smith (HM Government, 2012) that there were ‘hundreds of thousands of individuals and 
families living profoundly troubled lives marked by multiple disadvantages’, was 
operationalised in the identification of 120,000 troubled families underpinning the Troubled 
Families programme (Communities and Local Government, 2012), with local authorities 
provided with indicative numbers of troubled families in their own localities. Levitas (2014) 
challenges the construction and methodology of this estimate and it is not clear how it relates 
to other estimates, for example the 500,000 ‘forgotten families’ identified by the Riots, 
Communities and Victims Panel (2012) . The Government also constructs the definition of 
families to be targeted through its specific eligibility criteria of families with no adults in paid 
employment, a member in or at risk of offending or a child with poor school attendance (HM 
Government, 2012). This constructs the private troubles of families that are to be the public 
troubles of governmental intervention, emphasising reduced problematic personal conduct, 
improved education and pathways to employment that both New Labour and the Coalition 
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framed personal responsibility within. These also constitute the priorities for intervention and 
the indicators that will be deployed to measure ‘success.’  
The Government articulates definitive costs associated with these families of £9 billion (or 
£75,000 per family), within a context of a reported 3.2m incidents of ASB in 2010-2011 
(Home Office, 2012) and claims to know that this figure ‘is likely still to be the tip of the 
iceberg’ (Home Office, 2012: 8). The Government stated that its analysis showed that the 
Troubled Families Programme should successfully ‘turn around’ 20,000 families by March 
2015 (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2012: 10). Governmental 
updates state the success of the programme, with 62,000 families worked with and 22, 000 
families turned around’ (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2013a, 
2013b). Levitas (2014) identifies the power of the initial estimates of troubled families to 
frame the policy and intervention context, revealing how no local authority identified more 
troubled families that the central government estimate and how almost a quarter of local 
authorities identified the exact number of families estimated by central government. As 
Levitas argues, these estimates appear to define the contextual ‘reality’ of the number of 
families needing support, driven by the financial imperatives built in to the payment by 
results mechanism within the Troubled Families programme.  
The Government has claimed an authority to define the scale and nature of troubled families 
in England through the science of these statistics and through the establishment of the Early 
Intervention Foundation and publication of good practice guidance (Department for 
Communities and Local Government, 2012) which purport to collate and disseminate the 
empirical evidence base and accumulated knowledge of effective practice. But there has been 
a striking reluctance to open up this ‘scientific’ analysis and interpretation to transparency 
and scrutiny. Freedom of Information requests to establish how the £9 billion/ £75,000 per 
family figures were calculated failed to establish the methodology (Lister, 2014).  
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These grey areas between research, and its social scientific basis, and the governmental 
problem figuration of troubled families are epitomised in the report produced by Louise 
Casey, the Head of the Troubled Families Unit (Casey, 2012) which was classified by the 
Government as ‘dipstick/informal information gathering’ rather than ‘formal research’  
(Bailey, 2012; Ramesh, 2012). Bailey critiqued a shift from ‘evidence-based policy’ to 
‘policy by dipstick’ (Bailey, 2012; Ramesh, 2012), echoing a similar claim by Gregg (2010) 
that evidence-based policy had been replaced by ‘policy-based evidence’. Casey’s report 
presents an explicitly articulated ambiguity about its social-scientific status. It states that her 
interviews with 16 case study families ‘do not pretend to be an exact science’ and that ‘this is 
not formal research and these interviews and the information they gave us is not 
representative’ (Casey, 2012: 5). However, it also directly contradicts these caveats, stating 
‘it was thought important to listen directly to troubled families in order to get a true and 
recent understanding of the problems they faced, their histories and what the real challenge 
of ‘turning around’ thousands of such families nationwide would entail (Casey, 2012: 4, 
emphasis added). The Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, Eric 
Pickles, validated the report, claiming that it provided ‘real insights into these families’ lives’ 
and offered ‘a true understanding of the challenges local authorities face’ (Ramesh, 2012). 
Casey claimed that she ‘wanted to get to know these families’, ‘when probed [answers] were 
clear’, that she ‘spent a long time listening to [the families] and that she had attempted ‘to 
[get] underneath the skin of these families’ (Casey, 2012: 1-3). Leaving aside the volume of 
empirical and detailed research already undertaken with families (rather than one-off short 
interviews in an inappropriate and pressurised setting), Casey’s report is significant for the 
narratives, prioritises and assumptions it articulates about troubled families.  While Casey 
claims that ‘no judgements are made on these families’ this is precisely what her work serves 
to do. 
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Casey (2012: 1) identifies the centrality of ‘family’ as the causal site of problems and 
explicitly downplays wider structural factors:  
Several families talked of needing a bigger house from the council as a cause of 
problems for them, or of not getting enough free childcare, or they blamed teachers 
and schools for failing their children- when it was clear that their troubles were 
arising from their home life’ (Casey, 2012: 51, emphasis added).  
Structural factors are definitively dismissed (see Williams, 2012 for a critique), despite the 
body of empirical work on intensive interventions identifying their prominence. Similarly, 
the complexity of interactions and vulnerability are summarised as ‘many of the people we 
interviewed were just not very good at relationships’ (Casey, 2012: 48). The report highlights 
sexual and physical abuse; arson; a ‘majority’ of domestic abuse; incest and large numbers of 
children. It contrasts these families inability to ‘recover from and cope with’ episodes such as 
bereavement (Casey, 2012: 3), failing to cite evidence showing that ‘other families’ are ‘not 
completely derailed’ by bereavement’; and directly juxtaposes the case study families with 
‘normal’ individuals (Casey, 2012: 50). Casey’s diagnosis confirms Bond-Taylor’s (2014, 
153) identification of the politics of the Troubled Families Programme as manifested through 
a discourse of families as dysfunctional, inadequate, irresponsible and anti-social rather than 
disadvantaged, excluded and vulnerable. But, while Bond-Taylor (2014) also argues that the 
Troubled Families Programme demonstrates more continuity than divergence with New 
Labour the rhetorical construction of troubled families actually needs to be placed within the 
longer historical pervasiveness of these representations.  
The report’s argument that ‘intergenerational transmission of problems…was rife’ (Casey, 
2012: 46) locates this work in the long and still influential transmitted deprivation theory 
(Welshman, 2012) and tropes of deviant sexuality and domesticity consistently present since 
11 
 
Victorian times (Wise, 2009; Welshman, 2012). A focus on malingering, household squalor, 
inadequate parenting and financial management and failure to engage ‘appropriately’ with 
welfare services significantly influenced medical, social work professions and voluntary 
organisations’ engagement with families from 1940 onwards (Welshman, 2012).  
Casey’s report may be located within the broader problem figuration that spans both New 
Labour and the Coalition, in which the family is identified as a site where ‘personhood’ is 
created and the complex inter-related patterns of vulnerability and poverty are acknowledged 
(Parr, 2011; Millie, 2009a; Gillies, 2014) while, simultaneously a focus on lifestyles, family 
dynamics and parenting are disassociated from structural determinants and lived realities 
(Morris and Featherstone, 2010). Although Van Wel argues that problem figurations are often 
internally logical and rational, it is interesting to note that the gendered figuration of much 
anti-social behaviour discourse, focusing on the lack of maternal instinct or lone female 
parents, was not accompanied by gendered forms of supportive intervention that addressed 
the challenges of mothers or realigned the roles and responsibilities of fathers (Evans, 2012; 
Holt, 2009; Churchill, 2007).  
 
From National Problem Figuration to the Dilemmas of Localised Practice 
The article now examines the importance of local policy interpretations in constructing 
meaningful practice within national problem figurations and policy frameworks (Bond-
Taylor, 2014: 142; Hayden and Jenkins, 2014). The findings in this section are drawn from an 
ESRC- funded study exploring the delivery of 'Whole Household Interventions' in a large 
northern English city. The research, conducted in 2012-2013, comprised interviews with over 
50 individuals involved in the delivery of the model being used in the city; including Multi 
Agency Support Teams (MASTs) managers and  leaders,  intervention workers from a range 
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of agencies and organisations and seven families subject to whole household interventions. 
The city has been instrumental in pioneering family intervention initiatives and approaches 
since the early 2000's, including Family Intervention Projects, resulting in a legacy of 
projects with different genealogies being delivered. This patchwork of projects is now framed 
within the architecture of the Troubled Families programme but with a specific emphasis 
localised emphasis on a key worker- whole household approach as the main mechanism for 
delivering services to the most vulnerable families in the city,  scaled up and mainstreamed 
through the work of MASTs.  
In contrast to historic approaches, which typically involved multiple agencies working with 
families without sufficient coordination, shared knowledge of underlying issues or the 
resources needed to make a real difference, the whole household approach is delivered 
through three MASTs based across the city. These teams work with the whole family and are 
built on the principle of one key worker for each family. MASTs work with children, young 
people, and their families to provide a range of services that aim to improve wellbeing, 
school attendance, learning, behaviour and health care. Their additional remit is to signpost 
families to other services and support and assist their engagement with these services.  
The model adopted in the city appeared, therefore, to draw upon key learning from national 
research evidence about the importance of a key worker model, pooled resources, agency co-
ordination and holistic whole family interventions that were closely aligned with the 
rationality of the national problem figuration advocating key elements of family intervention 
models. Specific cumulative learning, such as the need to enable and resource workers to 
spend increased amounts of time with families, getting to know them and building trust and 
rapport delivered positive outcomes through facilitating an understanding of the complexity 
of family situations and a holistic assessment of their needs in order to identify causal factors 
and underlying issues which had often been hidden from other services. This 'getting to know' 
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period proved central to enabling intervention workers to develop a support and action plan 
meeting the needs of the family:  
I think we're really good at making those relationships with families and the trust that 
you build with them to effect change and I really do think we effect change and make 
a difference, whether it's a small difference or a big difference, I think we make a lot 
of change in families and that relationship with them is really good.  But again that 
takes time to do (Intervention Worker)  
Similarly, the centrality of addressing families' immediate issues was also prioritised by 
intervention workers. Providing direct support to families mainly through emotional, practical 
and financial assistance was valued highly by families: 
She's all right, I'm comfy saying anything to her…she [intervention worker] doesn't 
come and just say what she wants, she'll listen to you, she has got time to sit and listen, 
not like some people…she'll talk you through it, she'll not say 'you've got to do it' cos 
if someone tells me I've got to do it, I won't do it.  If I know someone's here to help 
and if I know someone's here wanting to help then I'll work both ways" (Family 
Member) 
However, the case study also revealed the ambiguities, complexity and limitations of 
localised practice which are negated in national level problem figurations and policy 
guidance. Firstly, a genealogy of learning based on cumulative practice in the city was often 
in tension with the particular genealogy of different agencies and organisational practices 
with their own histories, challenging the extent to which a new localised regime of practice 
could be implemented. Although at a strategic level, there were agreed principles and a clear 
delivery model, 'buy in' at an operational level, embracing new ways of working, was slow to 
filter down and dislodging traditional working practices and challenging silo approaches were 
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difficult to overcome, limiting the extent to which families may be ‘gripped’ and bound 
within the seamless and coordinated mechanisms of intervention as conceptualised in 
national policy rationales.  
Existing services still tended to take an isolationist approach when addressing individual 
family members’ issues. It was not common for services to identify interdependencies and 
interlinked problems between family members by working with all the family and inter-
agency working between individuals in both MASTs and existing service providers was 
patchy. In cases where inter-agency working was stronger, this was often based upon positive 
relationships between key actors that had developed over a long period of time: 
Try and work in partnership and that's where I feel that real partnership working and 
building trust and rapport with your colleagues is so important, cos what I do then is 
even if we may not like each other we've got to have that professional relationship and 
I think that's really important to build that so I pick up the phone and say 'you've sent 
this in, there's still all these concerns, come on' and we try to work as effectively as 
we can’   (MAST Team Leader) 
 
 
Furthermore, there was no shared, city-wide understanding of key working.  Numerous 
agencies reported adopting a key worker approach but these descriptions were rarely 
consistent. Roles presumed (by some services) to encapsulate key working did not fulfil all 
aspects of the approach and, despite the growing attempts by national and local policy and 
practice guidance to define and describe key worker roles, there remained a need to articulate 
what the whole household approach across the city would look like. The lack of knowledge 
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and understanding about MAST and the key worker role and remit varied within and between 
services and limited the engagement of some services. For example, some social workers 
worked closely with MAST workers and valued their contribution to a family case, whilst 
other services were unclear about the role of MAST and the whole household approach taken 
by its workers. Knowledge and awareness of education welfare and parenting classes were 
widespread, but knowledge of the early intervention and prevention work of MAST was often 
more limited.  This limited awareness, and a lack of understanding of the benefits flowing 
from preventative work, meant that officers in some services were unclear about when or 
why they would refer a client to MAST.   
Assessing the issues faced by the whole family is time consuming, requires a cross cutting 
multiple domain skill-set and involves an understanding of adult and child focused issues. 
Levering in appropriate services to deal with the more varied presenting issues for multiple 
family members requires close linkages with a wider range of services, and a broad 
commitment to greater multi-agency working.  While services, such as MAST, are 
establishing closer working relations and referral protocols with a host of child focused 
services, it was clear that there remained work to be done across the city to better join-up 
adult and children's services.   
Beyond the need for enhanced shared learning and definitions and improved coordination 
there were very significant limitations imposed by limited resources and expertise, which are 
seldom acknowledged in national policy discourses. One of the functions of key workers in 
often to identify the range of vulnerabilities impacting upon families which are often 
excavated as relationships develop:   
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The reality is reviews often fetch you more problems cos by then you've had more 
time to start befriending your family more, more issues come out (Intervention 
Worker) 
But this mapping of the range of problems does not necessarily translate into the necessary 
scale and diversity of interventions in response. It was often the case that support enabled 
families to function on a daily basis but, in line with the problem figuration of policy 
identified above negating structural explanations, did not address the underlying causes of the 
families' problems. Signposting and referral are one of the key components of key working. 
However, Intervention workers reported a number of difficulties escalating cases to specialist 
services: “We'll have it escalated to social care when it escalates to social care, social care bat 
it back down and send it to intervention work and it feeds back to us.” Whatever the reasons 
for the problems in referral, the intervention workers had to 'fill the gap'. Intervention 
workers reported they very often did not have the specialist expertise relevant to the case but 
felt they needed to continue to offer support and assistance wherever possible: 
Just from experience a few weeks ago I did ask for some support from one of our 
senior specialists regarding doing a swap in education and 10 days later got nowhere 
so I ended up doing it myself and did a good job so it makes you think try and do it 
yourself, I went into the inclusion centre and spoke to somebody high up there and 
she put me on right road. So it's not always their fault cos they've got that much work 
on.  (Intervention Worker) 
This inevitably placed stress on intervention workers and in some cases added to their already 
full workload. Additionally, the role and status of intervention workers was a source of 
tension.  Often intervention workers were in a position to identify causal factors and action 
some form of preventative measures, often necessitating the involvement of other specialist 
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services. However, their knowledge of the families' issues was often overlooked by specialist 
services who themselves were governed by access thresholds. There was a reported 
unwillingness of some officers in some services to cede responsibilities to intervention 
workers. In some cases this could be linked to professional status and grade. This reflects the 
misunderstanding of the key worker role and the differentiation between the role of key 
worker and a specialist agency, but this form of tension is likely to become increasingly 
prevalent as the Troubled Families Programme and wider welfare reform seek to enhance the 
role of private, voluntary and community organisations in the delivery of interventions.   
Rolling out a Whole Household Approach in the city raised a number of challenges and 
revealed a number of disjunctions with the proposed or presumed links within national policy 
frameworks between mechanisms and outcomes. The localised differentiation of a Troubled 
Families programme model and how this is interpreted and delivered is evident (not least in 
the case study city not articulating the terminology of ‘troubled families’). It is also clear that 
practice knowledge is unevenly shared across organisations (and cumulative knowledge is 
further threatened by cutbacks in specialist services and the precarity of many experienced 
practitioners and organisations’ funding status). The case study illustrates how key pillars of 
the Troubled Families programme: short time scales and explicit linear exit routes; clear cut 
identification of eligible/ appropriate targeted families; measurable quantitative outcome 
indicators; the financial incentive apparatus (in the context of substantial reductions in 
budgets); and the perceived positive influences of multi-sectoral delivery; are all challenged 
by the complex reality of localised dilemmas and experiences of practice. This confirms 
previous findings (Hayden and Jenkins, 2014; Van Wel, 1992; Welshman 2012) that good 
practice and cumulative learning within problem figurations and governmental mechanisms 
are always selective: highlighting the efficacy of particular elements (such as key workers 
and multi-agency partnerships) while simultaneously denying the primacy of other elements 
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(such as time, political power and status, resources and the complicated definitions of 
positive outcomes).  
 
 
.  
 
 
Conclusions 
This article has illustrated how debates about the research and evaluation of intensive family 
interventions in England since 1997, and more specifically the Coalition Government’s recent 
claims for scientific authority and the particular controversies over Louise Casey’s report, 
need to be located in an understanding that policy is formulated within a particular problem 
figuration of, ‘anti-social’ or ‘troubled families’ (Bond-Taylor, 2014; Hayden and Jenkins, 
2014; Van Wel, 1992). Debates between academics and government require a broader 
understanding that the figuration of ASB in policy and practice is formulated through an 
inherent relationship between empirical, rational and fictional elements. The continuities and 
disjunctions (Prior, 2009) in policy narratives and mechanisms between political 
administrations and between national rhetoric and programme formation and localised 
practice have also been identified. Many evaluations of intensive interventions have been 
positive (Batty and Flint, 2012; Hodgkinson and Jones, 2013) and the identification in 
government guidance (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2012) about key 
factors linked to success: a dedicated worker, practical hands on support, a persistent 
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approach, the whole-family scope of interventions and common purpose between agencies, is 
aligned with evaluation evidence.  
However, the case study presented in this article identifies a series of unresolved issues about 
responsibilities, resources, measuring (and valuing) incremental as well as transformative 
outcomes and how the increasingly complex landscape of public, private and 
voluntary/community provision and interactions may be negotiated by families and 
practitioners (Morris, 2013).  The effects of localism and payment by results that are central 
to the Troubled Families Programme are yet to be determined, as are the impacts of the new 
Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. The claims and counter-claims about 
the efficacy of the Troubled Families Programme and intensive family intervention models 
are the latest instalment in the historic failure to adequately utilise acquired learning. This is 
often masked by selective claims to the authority of evidence-based policy-making (Hayden 
and Jenkins, 2014; Van Wel, 1992; Welshman, 2012) within a politics of ASB that invokes 
fictional bias as a mechanism of power which has an inherent, but very problematic, 
relationship to knowledge and the claims of scientific evidence-based policy making.  
Acquired and cumulative learning will inevitably always be subject to contestation given that 
discourses of societal problems, including ‘troubled families’ are inherently political in their 
construction. However, there are a number of mechanisms through which acquired learning 
from the genealogies of practice may be protected. Firstly there needs to be recognition that 
substantial local accumulated experience and expertise risks being ruptured or lost through 
the discontinuation of funding for projects and initiatives. Secondly, there is a need for 
stronger and longer governmental ‘memories’ and application of research evidence: Louise 
Casey’s (2012) report is a classic example of failing to utilise a substantial body of 
knowledge (albeit a body of knowledge that had, quite appropriately, been subject to critique). 
Finally problem figurations derive much of their authority from their rational internal 
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consistency. Thereby, the logical conclusion of the governmental promotion of the key 
worker model within the Troubled Families programme is that excavating the full range of 
vulnerabilities, and their causes, experienced by families requires an ambition to 
meaningfully address the range of structural factors revealed as underpinning their ‘troubles.’  
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